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Abstract
The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state is generally described as the feeling that one knows a target
word and recall of this word is imminent, although the word is currently unrecallable. Research
suggests participants’ beliefs about their own knowledge affect the level and type of curiosity
experienced while in a TOT state. This study examined the interaction between demand
characteristics and specific types of curiosity experienced while in a TOT state. Demand
characteristics were expected to affect the type of curiosity experienced, with participants in the
high-demand group experiencing more negative forms of curiosity and the low-demand group
experiencing more positive forms of curiosity. Participants in each demand condition completed
a trivia task designed to elicit TOT states, a personality questionnaire, and a multiple-choice
recognition task for the same trivia items from the first task. Overall, the low demand group
experienced higher levels of curiosity for most feeling-of-knowing states and a more positive
form of curiosity then the high demand group. Results are partially consistent with the approachgradient theory of curiosity, but also indicate that demand characteristics may differentially
affect the two types of curiosity examined.
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Curiosity, Demand Characteristics, and the Tip-of-the-Tongue State
In general, people tend to think of memory and retrieval as all-or-nothing processes.
Either a particular fact is in one’s memory, or it is not; consequently, we can retrieve that fact, or
we can not. But anyone who has ever experienced a tip-of-the-tongue state (and research
indicates that most of us have), will know that memory does not always work this way. During a
tip-of-the-tongue state, people are unable to recall a specific word, but feel sure that the word is
in their memory and that it will come to them shortly. Recall feels imminent. Schwartz (1991)
refers to tip-of-the-tongue research as both a “gold mine” and a “can of worms” in that it has the
potential to offer unique insights to lexical retrieval and memory processes, but is also fraught
with perplexities and inconsistencies (p. ix).
The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon (referred to hereafter as TOT) is very common and
possibly universal. According to survey data, most people report an average of one TOT
experience per week (Brown, 1991). Additionally, researchers have found evidence for the
existence of the TOT phenomenon in illiterate speakers (Brennen, Vikan, & Dybdahl, 2007) and
in deaf cultures where it is referred to as the tip-of-the-fingers phenomenon (Thompson,
Emmorey, & Gollan, 2005). The TOT phenomenon is even described in a remarkably similar
way in different languages. In a survey of fluent, mostly native speakers of languages other than
English, 45 of the 51 languages surveyed used some variation of the “tongue” metaphor to
describe the feeling of not being able to retrieve a known word (Schwartz, 1991).
The TOT phenomenon can be defined as the experience of being temporarily unable to
retrieve a known word (Abrams, Trunk, & Merrill, 2007). Unlike ordinary word retrieval
failure, however, the TOT state often leaves people able to name some features of the target
word (e.g., syntactic; semantic), although its precise phonological form is inaccessible. For
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example, in a study by Ferrand (2001), French participants in a TOT state were able to correctly
name the gender of the word (which they were unable to recall) 75%-80% of the time, even for
nouns which had irregular gender forms. In contrast, Friedmann and Biran (2003) found that
Hebrew speakers were unable to access the gender of nouns in a TOT state, possibly because
Hebrew nouns can exist in a bare form in which gender is not made explicit. Hanley and
Chapman (2008) found that participants were able to determine if a celebrity’s name was two or
three words long significantly more accurately than chance, even though they were unable to
actually recall the name.
These studies support a two-stage model of word retrieval, with a meaning-based
retrieval stage followed by a form-based retrieval stage (Gollan & Brown, 2006). According to
this model, a TOT state occurs when an individual is able to successfully access the semantic
meaning of a word but is unable to retrieve the form of the word. This inability may be caused
by competition from phonologically or semantically related words (Abrams, Trunk, & Merrill
2007; Choi & Smith, 2005), by a lack of phonologically related words (Harley & Brown, 1998),
by weaker activation levels of weaker memory traces (Burke, MacKay, Worthley & Wade,
1991), or it may be a form of metacognitive control (Schwartz, Travis, Castro & Smith, 2000).
Many researchers are interested in TOT formation because they consider it a form of failed
lexical retrieval which can be studied to gain insight into the general process of lexical retrieval.
This model of TOT formation, which is commonly referred to as the direct access model,
relies on an implicit assumption about cognitive processes which Tulving named the doctrine of
concordance (Tulving, 1989). According to this doctrine, there is a straightforward correlation
between a given cognitive process, the observable behavior of a person, and their
phenomenological experience of the behavior and/or cognitive process. Tulving challenged this
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doctrine by claiming that underlying cognitive processes and the phenomenological experiences
that accompany them are often distinct but related (based primarily on evidence dissociating
retrieval from recollection). In other words, a model consistent with the doctrine of concordance
would posit the existence of a single cognitive process which would lead to both the associated
behavior and phenomenology. A model which was not consistent with the doctrine of
concordance would suppose that there might be separate cognitive processes for some behavior
and its phenomenology. In terms of TOT formation, a model adhering to the doctrine of
concordance would expect both failed lexical retrieval (the behavior) and the experience of a
TOT state (the phenomenology) to be caused by a single cognitive process.
The other main theory of TOT formation is an inferential model which arises out of
Tulving’s critique of the doctrine of concordance. Unlike the direct access model, which
supposes that a single cognitive process accounts for both the behavior (failed lexical retrieval)
and phenomenology of a TOT, the inferential model posits the existence of a separate process
responsible for the phenomenology of the TOT state. According to the inferential model, people
infer that they are experiencing a TOT state based on a variety of clues which inform them that
the target information is likely to be in their memory. This process is presumed to be primarily
unconscious (although the result, the experience of a TOT state, is a conscious one). Two
possible types of clues that may lead people to infer that they are experiencing a TOT state are
cue familiarity and the accessibility heuristic. According to the cue familiarity theory, TOTs
occur as a result of a strong feeling of familiarity elicited by a familiar cue (Metcalfe, Schwartz,
& Joaquim, 1993). For example, in one study participants were presented with word definitions
and asked to provide the correct word for each definition. Koriat and Lieblich (1977) then
analyzed these definitions along several dimensions and found that redundancy within the
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definitions led to more TOT states. Thus aspects of a specific cue can play a role in TOT
formation. According to the accessibility heuristic, the amount and intensity of information
retrieved while attempting to recall a specific target plays a role in TOT formation (Schwartz &
Smith, 1997). By using general knowledge questions for which there is no correct answer (e.g.,
what is the name of Mercury’s moon?), Schwartz (1998) was able to induce illusory TOT states
in an experiment. In other words, participants claimed to have memories of words which they
had never actually learned based on a feeling-of-knowing created by the relationship between the
false knowledge being tested (the name of Mercury’s moon) with the participants’ actual
knowledge (of astronomy). These results are inconsistent with the doctrine of concordance in
that the participants reported the phenomenological experience of a TOT in the absence of an
actual failed lexical retrieval (given that the lexical target item did not actually exist) and support
the inferential model in that participants seemed to rely on a feeling-of-knowing based on cue
familiarity when reporting TOT states.
Interestingly, research has indicated that some aspects of the TOT phenomenon may be
dependent on personality differences, which may be culturally or educationally based. Almost
all research conducted on the TOT phenomenon has studied highly literate Western participants.
In their work with illiterate speakers of the Mayan language of Q’eqchi’, Brennen et al. (2007)
found that, although most participants expressed some familiarity with the TOT phenomenon,
only university level participants were able or willing to report any partial information about the
target words. He speculates that this difference could be a result of varying levels of
metacognitive attitude and epistemic curiosity. People with high metacognitive attitude
“…savour their thoughts, wonder about the workings of their mind, and thereby find depth that
others simply do not find” (p.168). Therefore, people with high metacognitive attitude are more
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likely to experience TOTs because they have an introspective interest in word retrieval that those
with lower metacognitive attitude lack. This conceptualization of metacognitive attitude is very
similar to epistemic curiosity, which is defined as a measurable desire or drive for knowledge
(Litman & Spielberger, 2003). As such, epistemic curiosity is thought to motivate
inquisitiveness and experimentation, and underlie intellectual development and scholarly
achievement (Litman, 2008). As a personality trait, epistemic curiosity is associated with the
intrinsic pleasure of learning and positive emotional-motivational states of interest, and can vary
across individuals.
The purpose of my study is to further examine the relationship between epistemic
curiosity (a specific aspect of metacognitive attitude) and the tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state.
Previous research suggests that participants’ beliefs about their own knowledge affect the level
and type of curiosity they experience for a variety of feeling-of-knowing states (Litman,
Hutchins & Russon, 2005). In a study by Litman et al. (2005), participants were presented with
a set of general knowledge trivia questions and then asked to indicate their feeling-of-knowing
state (FOK) by reporting either “I know the answer”, “The answer is on the tip-of-my-tongue”,
or “I don’t know the answer”. After that participants reported how confident they were in their
answer and how curious they were to see the answer to each question (a measure of statecuriosity). All participants also completed a curiosity-trait questionnaire designed to assess their
level of Epistemic Curiosity (pleasurable feelings of interest and enjoyment in learning) and
Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation (unpleasant feelings of uncertainty and tension, which
motivate knowledge-seeking). According to state trait theories of emotion and personality,
people with higher levels of a particular personality trait experience the corresponding emotional
trait more strongly (at a greater intensity) than those with lower levels of the particular trait. The
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dual measurement of both state and trait curiosity thus allows for both an examination of
individual differences and a subtle way to distinguish between different types of curiosity. A
subsample of the participants also completed a multiple-choice recognition-memory task in
which the general knowledge trivia questions were presented a second time, this time in
multiple-choice format.
Litman et al. (2005) found that the participants’ self-reported FOK judgments for trivia
items were positively correlated with their self-reported levels of state curiosity (how curious
they were to see the answer to specific items). TOT states were characterized by both the highest
FOK confidence ratings (not including items for which participants were able to report the
answers) and the highest levels of curiosity, but TOT states did not yield significantly greater
recall on the forced-choice recognition-memory task than Don’t Know (DK) states. This result
indicates that participants’ beliefs about their own knowledge were not accurate predictors of
performance on a memory task, or in other words, feeling-of-knowing did not correspond to
actual knowing. This correlation between FOK and curiosity supports the approach-gradient
theory of motivation, which predicts that the intensity of a motivational state peaks as one
approaches the achievement of a goal. In this case, curiosity is the state which peaks as one
approaches the goal of retrieving the target information, thereby “closing” the knowledge-gap.
Additionally, the different types of trait curiosity corresponded to different FOK
judgments. Trait levels of Epistemic Curiosity (EC), the more positive form of curiosity, were
positively correlated to state curiosity levels for Don’t Know states, whereas Curiosity as a
Feeling-of-Deprivation (CFD), the more negative form of curiosity, correlated with state
curiosity levels for TOT states (Litman, Hutchins & Russon, 2005). This is especially interesting
in light of the results which found no actual difference between TOT and Don’t Know states in
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terms of performance on a recognition task. Therefore the difference in the types of curiosity
experienced by participants was related to participants’ perceptions of their own knowledge
rather than their actual knowledge.
Other research has found that situational factors, such as certain types of social pressure,
can affect TOT rates. One type of social pressure, referred to as demand characteristics in the
literature, can be defined as the assumed degree of pressure felt by the participants to answer
experimenter-provided general knowledge questions. Such demand characteristics influence the
number of TOT states reported by participants, with high-demand conditions yielding higher
TOT rates (Widner, Smith & Graziano, 1996). In this study, participants were told that other
people found a set of general knowledge trivia questions either very difficult to answer (lowdemand condition; LD) or relatively easy to answer (high-demand condition; HD). In fact, all of
the trivia questions were moderately difficult to answer. In the first experiment, the trivia
questions were presented to participants on a computer screen in the presence of a researcher to
whom they reported their answers and whether or not they were experiencing a TOT state. It
was assumed that informing participants that the questions were difficult would place less
demand on them because they would feel less pressure to perform well in front of the researcher
than if they had been informed that the questions were relatively easy. Participants reported
significantly more TOT states in the high-demand condition than in the low-demand condition,
but there were no differences in accuracy (on a multiple-choice task involving the same set of
trivia questions) for the reported TOT states across demand condition. The second experiment
was identical to the first except that participants were now asked to report feeling-of-knowing
(FOK) states instead of TOT states. The authors defined FOK states as follows: “If you feel you
know the answer to a presented question but can’t remember it at the moment, and you feel that
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you could identify the correct answer from a list of similar words, if shown to you at a later point
in time, then you are in a feeling-of-knowing state.” Based on this definition, the primary
difference between a FOK and TOT is the lack of a feeling of imminent recall. Surprisingly,
unlike TOT states, neither the frequency nor accuracy of FOK states was affected by the demand
manipulation. The authors hypothesize that this is because the demand characteristics primarily
affect the imminency component of the TOT state rather than the familiarity component, but also
indicate that more research is needed to flesh out the effect of the demand manipulation.
According to the approach-gradient theory of curiosity, this demand manipulation should affect
the level of curiosity felt by participants because of its effect on the perceived imminence of the
recall of a target word.
Previous research thus indicates that participants’ beliefs about their own knowledge
affect the level and type of curiosity they experience while in a TOT state (Litman, Hutchins &
Russon, 2005). The differences in curiosity levels are explained by the approach gradient theory
which expects that curiosity will be more intense for target items which feel closer to being
recalled. Thus TOT states yield higher curiosity levels than DK states. The differences in
curiosity type (positive or negative) are linked to the different recall states. DK states were
associated with positive forms of curiosity and TOT states were associated with more negative
forms of curiosity. This difference is explained by the approach gradient theory in that larger
perceived knowledge gaps (as in a DK state) are associated with less intense and more positive
forms of curiosity and smaller knowledge gaps (as in a TOT state) are associated with more
intense and more negative forms of curiosity. Research also indicates that putting higher
demand on participants to answer trivia questions causes them to report experiencing more TOT
states, possibly by affecting the imminency component of the TOT state (Widner, Smith &
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Graziano, 1996). This study is an examination of the effects of the demand manipulation on
curiosity and the TOT state. According to the approach gradient theory, people in the high
demand condition should experience higher levels of curiosity because of the demand
manipulation’s effect on the imminency component of TOT states. Demand characteristics are
also predicted to have an effect on the types of curiosity experienced while in various states.
Since demand characteristics seem to affect the feeling of imminence associated with the TOT
state, participants in the high-demand group are expected to experience more negative forms of
curiosity (uncertainty and tension) and participants in the low-demand group are expected to
experience more positive forms of curiosity (interest in learning).
Method
Participants
Eighty undergraduate Macalester students between the ages of 18 and 23 participated in
this study. Participants were recruited from Introductory Psychology courses and Cognitive
Psychology courses. Participants enrolled in Introductory Psychology received course credit for
participating. All other participants were entered into a prize lottery in exchange for
participating.
Materials
All materials for this experiment were presented on a PC computer using E-Prime
software. The instructions for this experiment presented participants with a specific definition of
the TOT state and created certain demand characteristics. Participants were presented with
Brown and McNeill’s (1966) description of the TOT state which explains: “If you are unable to
think of the word but feel sure that you know it and that it is on the verge of coming back to you
then you are in a TOT state.” As in Widner, Smith, and Graziano (1996), demand characteristics
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were adjusted by presenting participants with statements embedded within the experiment’s
instructions. In the low-demand condition, the instructions contained the statement: “In this
experiment you will be presented with a number of questions that should be quite difficult to
answer. In fact, approximately 95% of the students who have already participated in this
experiment had great difficulty in answering them.” In the high-demand condition, the
instructions contained the statement: “In this experiment you will be presented with a number of
questions that should be quite easy to answer. In fact, approximately 95% of the students who
have already participated in this experiment had little difficulty in answering them.”
For this experiment, TOT states were elicited using 37 items drawn from Nelson and
Narens (1980) list of 300 questions. Each item consisted of a question with a one word answer
(e.g., “What is the last name of the author who wrote “Brothers Karamazov”?” with the answer
being “Dostoyevsky”). To make both demand conditions believable, questions with varied
normative probability of recall were chosen (mean p recall ranged from 0.019 to 0.778) and
question topics were varied, including history, literature, and general knowledge items.
Questions for which males and females had reliably different recall probabilities were avoided.
For the recognition-memory task, multiple choice options for these trivia items were presented
along with the questions. For each question, one correct answer was presented along with three
plausible distractors, for example, “What is the last name of the author who wrote "Brothers
Karamazov"? (a) Gogol, (b) Nabokov, (c) Tolstoy, (d) Dostoyevsky”. The position of the
correct answer varied for each question.
The Epistemic Curiosity (EC) stimuli consisted of 10 items drawn from Litman and
Spielberger’s EC questionnaire (Litman & Spielberger, 2003). These items are all statements
designed to measure participants’ curiosity; for example, “When I come across a word I don’t
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know, I look up its meaning.” This EC scale has been shown to have high reliability (α = .85 for
women and α = .81 for men), and also significant positive correlations with a Perceptual
Curiosity scale (r = .57, p <.001) and the STPI Trait Curiosity scale (r = .61, p <.001), thus
providing evidence for its convergent validity (Litman & Spielberger, 2003).
The Curiosity as Feeling-of-Deprivation (CFD) stimuli consisted of 15 items drawn from
Litman and Jimerson’s CFD questionnaire (2004). These items are all statements designed to
measure participants’ curiosity; for example, “It bothers me if I don't know a word, so I will look
up the meaning.” Where the EC scale is correlated with mastery-oriented learning, the CFD
scale is more closely related to failure-avoidance and success-orientation (Litman, 2008).
Procedures
Participants were randomly assigned to either the high or low demand group.
Participants were presented with the informed consent form and asked to indicate their consent
by signing the form. Participants then completed the experiment, with a researcher present in the
room the entire time.
Participants first completed the trivia portion of the experiment. The instructions for this
section of the experiment gave the participants Brown and McNeill’s (1966) definition of a TOT
state and contained either the high or low demand statement about the alleged difficulty of the
trivia items. During the trivia portion of the experiment, participants were presented with the 37
trivia questions drawn from Nelson and Narens (1980) in random order. Participants recorded
their responses on the computer by either typing in an answer or a question mark (to indicate that
they did not know the answer). After responding to each question, participants were asked if
they experienced a TOT for that question (and responded with either a “Y” for yes or an “N” for
no), and then asked to indicate on a 4-point likert-type scale how curious they were to see the
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answer to that particular question (the scale anchors were “not at all curious” and “very
curious”).
After completing the trivia portion of the experiment, participants responded to the two
curiosity scales. The EC and CFD stimuli lists were combined and presented one item at a time
in random order. Participants were instructed to report how they “generally feel” for each
statement. The response scale for each item ranged from 1 (almost never), 2 (sometimes), 3
(often), to 4 (almost always) (Litman & Spielberger, 2003; Litman & Jimerson, 2004).
After completing the curiosity trait assessments, participants were given a forced-choice
recognition-memory test on the same trivia questions which they encountered in the first portion
of the experiment. Participants were not told in advance that this would be a part of the
experiment to avoid influencing their answers during the first trivia section. The recognition
trivia questions were again presented one at a time in random order, but this time accompanied
by the four multiple choice options. Participants were forced to choose one answer for every
trivia question and were instructed to guess if they were unsure of the correct answer. At the end
of this section, participants were debriefed and thanked for participating.
Results
The data from the first trivia portion of the experiment consisted of the participant’s
answer to each trivia question (either an answer or a question mark indicating that they did not
know the answer), their response to the question asking if they had experienced a TOT state
(either yes or no), and their response to the state curiosity question (which could range from 1 to
4 with larger numbers indicating higher levels of curiosity). Responses for each trivia question
were coded as belonging to one of four categories: Know (K), Don’t Know (DK), Resolved-TOT
(RTOT), or Unresolved-TOT (URTOT). When a participant was able to correctly answer a
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trivia question and did not report a TOT state, this was considered “Know” state. Conversely,
when a participant was not able to correctly answer a trivia question and did not report a TOT
state, this was considered a “Don’t Know” state. When a participant was able to correctly
answer a trivia question after having been in a TOT state, this was considered a Resolved-TOT
state, and when a participant was not able to correctly answer a trivia question after having been
in a TOT state, this was considered an Unresolved-TOT state. Each trivia question and state
curiosity response was coded as belonging to one of these four states. The personality trait data
consisted of an average score for each participant for each type of curiosity (Epistemic Curiosity
and Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation). The data from the recognition portion of the
experiment consisted of participant’s responses to each multiple-choice trivia question. These
responses were then coded for accuracy. Results reported as significant had associated p-values
of less than .05.
Scores for the two personality trait measures and overall recognition accuracy were
compared across demand condition to ensure that the two groups did not differ in terms of
personality or general knowledge. Mean scores for the trait curiosity measures are presented in
Table 1. There were no significant differences between participants in the High and Low
Demand conditions for either of the personality trait measures (EC: p > .40; CFD: p > .40).
There was also no significant difference between the two conditions in terms of overall
performance on the multiple-choice trivia task (p > .40). Thus group assignment appears to be
sufficiently random in terms of curiosity and general knowledge.
Average curiosity responses for each participant for each state (RTOT, URTOT, DK and
K) were calculated and compared across demand conditions. Based on the approach-gradient
theory of curiosity, I predicted that participants in a URTOT state would report the highest levels

Tip of the Tongue

16

of curiosity, followed by the DK state and then K and RTOT states (which should elicit
comparable levels of curiosity). The approach-gradient theory would also predict that
participants in the High Demand condition would experience higher levels of curiosity compared
to those in the Low Demand condition. Figure 2 contains mean curiosity levels divided by state
and demand condition. Overall, participants reported higher levels of curiosity in the low
demand condition compared to the high demand condition. This difference was significant for K
states (F(1,68) = 9.186, p = .003) and RTOT states (F(1,70) = 7.689, p = .007), marginally
significant for URTOT states (F(1,78) = 3.891, p = .052), and not significant for DK states
(F(1,78) = 1.297, p = .258). Tukey’s HSD was used to compare average curiosity responses
across state (RTOT, URTOT, DK and K) and collapsed across demand condition (see Table 2
for homogenous subsets). Curiosity levels between all states varied significantly except between
DK and RTOT states.
Demand characteristics were predicted to affect the type of curiosity experienced with
participants in the high-demand condition experiencing more negative forms of curiosity (CFD)
and participants in the low-demand condition experiencing more positive forms of curiosity
(EC). Only URTOT and DK state curiosity levels were investigated since previous research
indicates that these are the feeling-of-knowing states for which state curiosity is related to trait
curiosity (Litman et al., 2005). Correlations between personality trait measures of curiosity and
state measures of curiosity were calculated, and Fisher’s z’ transformation was used to compare
correlation coefficients. Correlations between EC and CFD trait curiosity measures and state
curiosity measures for URTOT and DK states are presented in Table 3 and correlation
comparisons for URTOT states are presented in Table 4. There were no significant correlations
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between CFD trait curiosity and URTOT state curiosity in either demand condition. The
difference between these two correlations was also not significant. There was a significant
correlation between EC trait curiosity and URTOT state curiosity in the low demand condition,
but not in the high demand condition. The difference between these two correlations was
approaching significance (z’ = 1.57, p = .1164). There were no significant correlations between
either type of trait curiosity and DK state curiosity for either demand condition, nor were the
differences between any of the DK correlations significant. As expected, there was also a
significant correlation between the two measures of trait curiosity in both conditions (HD: r =
.335, p = .035; LD: r = .598, p < .001). Unexpectedly, the difference between these two
correlations was approaching significance (z’ = 1.47, p = .141).
A review of the literature on these curiosity scales yielded an alternate way of measuring
these two types of curiosity in a way which further differentiates between the two scales. Litman
(2008) performed a factor analysis of the EC and CFD scales and selected, for each scale, the
five items with the highest loadings. These new scales were relabeled as measuring the Interest
(I-EC) and Deprivation (D-EC) factors of Epistemic Curiosity.1 I-EC is associated with
acquiring knowledge simply for the pleasure of doing so (mastery-oriented learning) whereas DEC is associated with an unsatisfied need-like state in which the correctness, accuracy, and
relevance of the unknown information is vitally important (performance-oriented learning). The
new I-EC scale corresponds to the previous EC scale and the D-EC scale corresponds to the CFD
scale. Using participants’ responses to the EC and CFD scales, I was able to calculate their
average scores for the new I-EC and D-EC scales. Correlations between the old and new

1

The use of the term “Epistemic Curiosity” is somewhat inconsistent across papers. Up to this point, the term has
been used in this paper to describe a specific form of curiosity which involves pleasurable feelings of interest and
enjoyment in learning. Epistemic curiosity in the Litman (2008) paper is used to describe the broader category of
curiosity underlying both the previous EC and CFD scales.
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curiosity scales were calculated to validate the relationships between the two sets of scales (see
Table 5). As would be expected, all four curiosity scales are significantly correlated with each
other. But the correlation between the EC and CFD scales is significantly stronger than the
correlation between the I-EC and D-EC scales when the two correlations are compared using
Fisher’s z’ transformation (z’ = 2.18, p = 0.0293). Moreover, the correlations between the new
and old curiosity scales are numerically (although not significantly) different in the desired
directions (the correlation between EC and D-EC is smaller than the correlation between EC and
CFD, and the correlation between CFD and I-EC is smaller than the correlation between CFD
and EC).
As before, correlations between these new personality trait measures of curiosity and
state measures of curiosity were calculated, and Fisher’s z’ transformation was used to compare
correlation coefficients. Correlations between I-EC and D-EC trait curiosity measures and state
curiosity measures for URTOT and DK states are presented in Table 6. The pattern of results is
largely the same as those obtained using the less differentiated curiosity scales, with the
exception of the correlation between state curiosity experienced while in a DK state and I-EC
trait curiosity in the low demand condition (which is now significant).
Average accuracy scores on the multiple-choice recognition task were calculated for each
participant for each state (RTOT, URTOT, DK and K) and compared across states. There were
no significant differences across condition for accuracy in any state, so accuracy scores were not
analyzed separately by condition. Scores could range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing a perfect
score. Not surprisingly, accuracy was highest for those questions which participants had been
able correctly answer during the first trivia portion of the experiment: the RTOT and K states
(means shown in Figure 3). Tukey’s HSD revealed that the difference between RTOT and K
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accuracy scores was not significant (p > 0.4), but the differences between all other accuracy
scores were significant (p < .001 for all comparisons). The difference in accuracy between the
URTOT and DK states is the most noteworthy. This difference indicates that the participants
were significantly more accurate in answering recognition trivia questions which they had
previously been unable to answer if they had experienced a TOT state on those questions rather
than a DK state.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of demand characteristics on
participants’ experiences of curiosity within a variety of feeling-of-knowing states (Resolved and
Unresolved tip-of-the-tongue states, Know states, and Don’t Know states). Based on previous
research, I predicted that the demand manipulation would cause participants in the high demand
group to experience more negative forms of curiosity (uncertainty and tension) and the lowdemand group to experience more positive forms of curiosity (interest in learning). I also
predicted that the demand manipulation would affect the overall level of curiosity experienced
by the participants. Reported curiosity levels and performance on a surprise recognition task
were also expected to differ as a function of the type of state reported by participants.
The results indicate that demand characteristics did have some effect on curiosity level.
Participants in the low demand condition reported higher levels of curiosity than those in the
high demand condition for all feeling-of-knowing states except Don’t Know. This difference is
inconsistent with the approach-gradient theory, which would predict that participants in the high
demand condition should experience higher levels of curiosity due to the heightened feeling of
imminence. However, this result is consistent with the literature on curiosity which indicates
that social anxiety and curiosity are inversely related (Kashdan, 2007).
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Additionally, curiosity levels, collapsed across demand condition, varied as a result of
participants’ feeling-of-knowing states, with participants reporting the highest levels of curiosity
while experiencing Unresolved TOT states, followed by Resolved TOT, Don’t Know, and lastly
Know states. That Resolved TOT states yielded significantly higher curiosity ratings than Know
states is somewhat surprising considering that in both situations the participant had correctly
retrieved the correct answer to the trivia question (and so should be experiencing very little
curiosity according to the approach-gradient theory). It is possible that the participants were
simply confused by the question (why would they be curious about something which they
already knew) and so interpreted the question as being past-tense (how curious were you instead
of how curious are you). The participants likely experienced heightened levels of curiosity
during the period of time prior to the resolution of their TOT state (technically every Resolved
TOT state must be preceded by an Unresolved TOT state) which may have influenced their final
curiosity self-rating if they were indeed interpreting the question in the past-tense. Another
possibility is that participants were less of sure of their answers following a Resolved TOT state
and so were interested in verifying their answer.
The curiosity correlation results are decidedly more difficult to interpret. While many of
the differences between the correlation coefficients were numerically different in the predicted
directions, only a handful of those differences were significant. State curiosity for UnresolvedTOT states in the low-demand condition was significantly correlated with trait Epistemic
Curiosity. This correlation indicates that participants in the low-demand condition were
experiencing this more positive form of curiosity while experiencing a TOT state. As predicted,
the difference between this correlation and the comparable correlation in the high-demand
condition was approaching significance, indicating that participants were experiencing a more
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positive form of curiosity while in a TOT state in the low demand condition as compared to the
high demand condition. This result is consistent with the approach-gradient theory of curiosity
in that demand characteristics were expected to affect the perception of knowledge gaps, and
larger knowledge gaps were associated with more positive forms of curiosity.
In contrast to this result, Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation was not significantly
correlated with state curiosity for any feeling-of-knowing state for either demand condition, nor
were there significant differences between the correlation coefficients across demand condition.
This is contradictory to the approach-gradient theory of curiosity in that smaller perceived
knowledge gaps, which were expected to be created by the demand manipulation, are associated
with this more negative form of curiosity. However, as mentioned earlier, a meta-analysis by
Kashdan (2007) found that social anxiety is negatively correlated with curiosity. The demand
manipulation used in this experiment, in addition to affecting the perception of knowledge gaps,
likely placed participants under some amount of stress and social pressure. This social pressure
may then have affected the type and level of curiosity felt by participants, especially in the high
demand condition. The marginal difference across demand condition in the correlation between
the two types of curiosity may also be explained by this social pressure if it differentially
affected the types of curiosity.
The results from the surprise recognition portion of the experiment provide support for
the validity of the TOT state (as distinct from other feeling-of-knowing states) and also support
the distinction between Resolved and Unresolved TOT states. In previous studies, researchers
have found no difference in accuracy on such surprise recognition between TOT states and Don’t
Know states, casting some doubt on the validity of the TOT phenomenon (Litman, Hutchins &
Russon, 2005; Widner, Smith & Graziano, 1996). It is possible that these studies failed to find a
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significant difference because they had smaller sample sizes and so may have lacked sufficient
power (only 60 of Litman et al.’s participants completed a recognition task and only 40 of
Widner et al.’s participants). If my study had not found a significant difference between
recognition accuracy for Unresolved TOT states and for Don’t Know states, this result would
have been supportive of a model of TOT formation (such as the inferential model) which is not
consistent with the doctrine of concordance. The lack of a significant difference would have
indicated that recognition accuracy (a behavioral check of memory) and the phenomenological
experience of a TOT state can be dissociated, and therefore must arise from separate cognitive
processes. As it is, this result is consistent with either model of TOT formation (since models
inconsistent with the doctrine of concordance still predict that behavior and phenomenology will
be correlated).
Overall, these results are partially consistent with the approach-gradient theory of
curiosity, but also indicate that the social pressure aspect of demand characteristics may
differentially affect the two types of curiosity examined. Participants in the low demand group
reported higher levels of curiosity, which was consistent with the literature on stress and
curiosity, but inconsistent with the approach-gradient theory of curiosity. But participants
reported higher levels of curiosity for TOT states than Know or Don’t Know states across
demand condition, which was consistent with the approach-gradient theory of curiosity. Demand
characteristics also affected the type of curiosity participants experienced while in a TOT state,
as indicated by differences in correlation coefficients. Participants in the low demand group
experienced a more positive form of curiosity while in a TOT state compared to participants in
the high demand group, but no significant differences for the more negative form of curiosity
were found. Demand characteristics clearly had some kind of effect on the type and level of
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curiosity experience during a tip-of-the-tongue state, but more research is needed to flesh out the
components of this effect. Future research should focus on the differential effects of stress and
demand characteristics on both the specific sub-types of curiosity and their specific effects on the
TOT state.
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Appendix A: Curiosity Measures
EC Stimuli (Litman & Spielberger, 2003):
I enjoy exploring new ideas.
I enjoy learning about subjects which are unfamiliar.
I think it's fascinating to learn new information.
When I learn something new, I like to find out more about it.
I enjoy discussing abstract concepts.
If I encounter a complicated piece of machinery, I ask how it works.
When given an arithmetic problem, I enjoy imagining solutions.
If I am presented with an incomplete puzzle, I try and imagine the final
solution.
I am interested in discovering how things work.
When presented with a riddle, I'm interested in trying to solve it.

CFD Stimuli (Litman & Jimerson, 2004):
When I read something that puzzles me, I keep reading until I understand.
I try to learn about complex topics because I don't like not knowing.
It's important to me to feel knowledgeable.
It bothers me if I don't know a word, so I will look up the meaning.
I spend time formulating my ideas clearly in order to be understood.
I have a hard time accepting mysteries that can't be solved.
It troubles me when there doesn't seem to be a reasonable solution to a problem.
It aggravates me if I can't remember a fact, and I think about it until it comes to me.
I'm critical of ideas and theories.
It really gets on my nerves when I am close to solving a problem, but still can't figure it
out.
Conceptual problems keep me awake thinking about solutions.
When faced with a problem, I can't rest without knowing the answer.
I get frustrated if I can't figure out a solution and work even harder to solve it.
I brood for a long time in order to solve a problem.
I work like a fiend at problems which must be solved.
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Interest-EC Stimuli (Litman, 2008):
I enjoy exploring new ideas.
I enjoy learning about subjects which are unfamiliar.
I think it's fascinating to learn new information.
When I learn something new, I like to find out more about it.
I enjoy discussing abstract concepts.

Deprivation-EC Stimuli (Litman, 2008):
Conceptual problems keep me awake thinking about solutions.
When faced with a problem, I can't rest without knowing the answer.
I get frustrated if I can't figure out a solution and work even harder to solve it.
I brood for a long time in order to solve a problem.
I work like a fiend at problems which must be solved.
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Appendix B: Trivia Items
Trivia Questions
What is the name of the
legendary one-eyed giant in
Greek mythology?
Which sport uses the terms
"stones" and "brooms"?
What is the last name of the
author of "Our Town"?
What is the name of the islandcity believed to have sunk into
the ocean?
What is the name of the furry
animal that attacks cobra
snakes?
What is the proper name for a
badminton bird?
What is the last name of the
man who assassinated president
John F. Kennedy?
What is the last name of the
artist who painted "Guernica"?
What is the name of the river
that runs through Rome?
What is the only word the raven
says in Edgar Allen Poe's poem
"The Raven"?
What is the last name of the
man who began the Reformation
in Germany?
What is the last name of the
author who wrote "Brothers
Karamazov"?
What is the last name of the
boxer who later became known
as Mohammud Ali?
What is the name of the north
star?
What is the name of the liquid
portion of whole blood?

1

2

3

4

Answer

Cyclops

Chimera

Minotaur

1

Curling

Luge

Satyr
Shuffleboar
d

Bocce

1

Wilder

Stein

Cather

Clift

1

Olympus

Atlantis

Valhalla

El Dorado

2

Hyena

Mongoose

Civet

Weasel

2

Stone

Shuttlecock

Wicket

Pallino

2

Ruby

Booth

Oswald

Hinckley

3

Gauguin

Braque

Picasso

Matisse

3

Tigris

Arno

Tiber

Po

3

Dreary

Lenore

Weary

Nevermore

4

Zwingli

Calvin

More

Luther

4

Gogol

Nabokov

Tolstoy

Dostoyevski

4

Clay

Frazier

Tyson

Dempsey

1

Sirius

Polaris

Cassiopeia

Orion

2

Lymph

Sebum

Plasma

Hemoglobin

3

What is the unit of electrical
power that refers to a current of
one ampere at one volt?
What is the last name of the
author of the book "1984"?

Pascal

Joule

Erg

Watt

4

Orwell

Greene

Zamyatin

Huxley

1

What is the name of the Roman
emperor who fiddled while Rome
burned?

Caligula

Nero

Claudius

Augustus

2
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What Italian city was destroyed
when Mount Vesuvius erupted in
79 A.D.?
What is the name of the
constellation that looks like a
flying horse?
What was the name of King
Arthur's sword?
What is the last name of the
artist who painted "American
Gothic"?
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Naples

Salerno

Pompeii

Aquitania

3

Equuleus

Andromeda

Draco

Pegasus

4

Excaliber

Gram

Hrunting

Glamdring

1

Anderson

Wood

Benton

Lewis

2

What is the last name of the
European author who wrote
"The Trial"?
What is the name of the island
on which Napoleon was born?

Joyce

Cocteau

Kafka

Brecht

3

Sicily

Majorca

Malta

Corsica

4

What is the last name of the
woman who founded the
American Red Cross?

Barton

Nightingale

Anthony

1

What is the capitol of Jamaica?
What is the capitol of Canada?

Portmore
Montreal

Kingston
Toronto

Mandeville
Ottowa

Pitcher
Montego
Bay
Calgary

What was the last name of the
female star of the movie
"Casablanca"?

Bogart

Hepburn

Kelly

Bergman

4

Hanford

Manhattan

Potsdam

Oppenheime
r

2

Descartes
Fontaineblea
u

Gauss
Luxembour
g

Euclid

Euler

3

Louvre

Versailles

4

Ahab

Ishmael

Herman

Starbuck

1

Engineer

Architect

Professor

Lawyer

2

Manchester

Stratford

London

Birmingham

3

Orcs

Eloi

Wargs

Morlocks

4

Cleo

Monstro

Figaro

Angel

1

Ibarra

Batista

Bosque

Torrado

2

What is the name of the project
which developed the atomic
bomb during World War II?
Who is known as the father of
geometry?
What is the palace built in
France by King Louis XIV?
What is the name of the captain
of the Pequod in the book "Moby
Dick"?
What was Frank Lloyd Wright's
profession?
In which city is Heathrow airport
located?
What is the name of the
villainous people who lived
underground in H.G. Wells' book
"The Time Machine"?
What was the name of the
goldfish in the story of
Pinnochio?
What is the last name of the
Cuban leader that Castro
overthrew?
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Table 1: Epistemic Curiosity and Curiosity as a Feeling-of-Deprivation Means and
Standard Deviations
Curiosity as a Feeling-ofCondition
Deprivation
Epistemic Curiosity

High Demand

Low Demand

Mean

2.702

2.785

Std. Dev.

0.3742

0.3766

Mean

2.7682

2.708

Std. Dev.

0.43835

0.5176

Table 2: Curiosity Tukey HSDa,b
N Subset for alpha = 0.05
1
2
3
Know
70 1.976
Don’t Know
80
2.5006
Resolved TOT
72
2.7278
Unresolved TOT
80
3.5181
Sig.
1
0.142
1
Means for groups in homogenous subsets are
displayed.
a. Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 75.224
b. The group sizes are unequal. The harmonic mean
of the group is used. Type I error levels are not
guaranteed.
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Table 3: Trait and State Curiosity Correlations
CFD
High Demand: Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N

CFD

Low Demand:

CFD

1
40

EC

URTOT

EC
URTOT
0.335*
0.184
0.035
0.257
40
40
1
0.031
0.85
40
40
1
40

DK

CFD
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig
N

EC

URTOT

EC
URTOT
1 0.598**
0.197
<0.001
0.223
40
40
40
1
.377*
0.016
40
40
1
40

DK

Table 4: EC and CFD Correlation Comparisons
EC/URTOT LD CFD/URTOT HD
EC/URTOT HD
N
40
40
Z’
1.57
0.67
Sig
0.1164
0.502
CFD/URTOT LD N
40
40
Z’
0.85
0.058
Sig
0.395
0.48

DK
-0.017
0.917
40
0.084
0.605
40
0.286
0.074
40
1
40
DK
-0.112
0.492
40
0.236
0.143
40
0.354*
0.025
40
1
40
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Table 5: Curiosity Scale Correlations
D-EC

I-EC

CFD

EC

Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N

D-EC
1
80

I-EC
0.176
0.119
80
1
80

CFD
0.888
0.00
80
0.335
0.002
80
1
80

EC
0.401
0.00
80
0.785
0.00
80
0.485
0.00
80
1
80
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Table 6: Revised Trait and State Curiosity Correlations
D-EC I-EC
URTOT DK
High Demand: Pearson Correlation D-EC
1 -0.002
0.184 -0.065
Sig
0.989
0.254
0.688
N
40
40
40
40
Pearson Correlation I-EC
1
-0.016
0.181
Sig
0.922
0.263
N
40
40
40
Pearson Correlation URTOT
1
0.286
Sig
0.074
N
40
40
Pearson Correlation DK
1
Sig
N
40
D-EC EC
URTOT DK
Low Demand: Pearson Correlation D-EC
1 0.332*
0.089 -0.223
Sig
0.036
0.586
0.167
N
40
40
40
40
Pearson Correlation I-EC
1
.314*
.378*
Sig
0.049
0.016
N
40
40
40
Pearson Correlation URTOT
1 0.354*
Sig
0.025
N
40
40
Pearson Correlation DK
1
Sig
N
40
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Average Curiosity Responses
Figure 2. Recognition Accuracy Means
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4
3.5

High Demand

Reported Curiosity

Low Demand
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Know

Don't Know

Resolved-TOT

Unresolved-TOT

State

0.6
0.5

Accuracy

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Know

Resolved TOT

Unresolved
TOT

Don't Know
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